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The “military anarchy” witnessed the decline and fall of the political institutions of the Early 
Empire. That period may be interpreted not only as a time of total destruction but also as a 
transition from on stage of the Roman state to another. The transition was rather spasmodic, 
revolutionary. By analogy the “military anarchy” may be defined as the second Roman 
Revolution, just appearing new elements of a future state: The Late Empire. 
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La “anarquía militar” atestigua la disminución y la caída de las instituciones políticas del 
Alto Imperio. Aquel período puede ser interpretado no sólo como una época de destrucción 
total, sino también como una transición de una forma de gobierno romana hacia otra. La 
transición era bastante discontinua, revolucionaria. Por analogía “la anarquía militar” puede 
ser definida como la segunda Revolución romana, apareciendo los nuevos elementos de un 
futuro estado: El Bajo Imperio. 
 
Palabras clave: Cambios políticos, autocracia, descentralización, elite dirigente, sacralización. 
 
 
Recently the problem of power in general and empires in particular has again 
become as urgent as ever featuring prominently in many historical and humanitarian 
studies. The facts and experience of the Roman Empire appear to be of a special 
interest for the scholars1. In this context, the study of the “military anarchy” throws 
_____________ 
 
1 V.I. Ukolova. The Empire as “the sense” of historical space, en: Power, Society, Indi-
vidual in Medieval Europe, Moscow, 2008, p. 20 (in Russian); A.I. Miller, The Legacy of 
the Empires and Mass Consciousness, en The Legacy of the Empires and the Future of 
Russia, Moscow, 2008, p. 26-28 (in Russian). According to A.I. Miller, the Roman Empire 
is no longer considered to be a pattern for the following empires. Yet somehow all scholars 
still use the Roman Empire as a certain yardstick to compare similar states with. 
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much light on how onw political system was being ousted by another born within 
the previous one–two clashing systems coexisting within a framework of one state. 
In world historiography there is of late a tendency to deny the existence of the 
third century crisis as such. Many historians relying chiefly on archaeological datta 
do not believe the economic, social and political mechanism of Rome suffered a 
radical breakdown at all2. They refuse to see any qualitative difference between the 
Early and late Empires, between the principate and the Dominate. In their opinion, 
no catastrophic changes occurred in the third century, only some regional mutations 
slightly on ever not at all affected the general situation3. They insist that the third 
century saw the further development of the previous tendencies and the seeds of the 
new evolving at that time were later taken up and further elaborated by the tetrarchs 
and Constantine4. Putting it differently, it was in fact a comparatively slow evolu-
tional process. Therefore we believe it might be worthwhile to study the problem 
again. 
A preliminary remark before describing theevents of the years 235-285. In the 
course of its existence the Roman state had witnessed three great crises5. The first 
crisis erupted at the end of the Republican period, when Tiberius Gracchus rose in 
opposition against the Senate, and in 88 B.C. it evolved into the agony of the Re-
public6. The third crisis, as we think, was ushered in by Theodosius’ death in 395. 
The Oriental Empire managed to overcome the crisis, but in the West, the assassina-
tion of Valentinian III in 454 and the rout of Rome by the Vandals in 455 marked 
the beginning of the Empire’s decline and fall7. If we are to measure the second 
crisis with the same yardstick, we may discern two qualitatively different periods –
the crisis proper the beginning of wich, to our mind, was the assassination of Alex-
ander Severus and the rise of Maximinus8. Since the principal although not the only 
_____________ 
 
2 On these “revisionist” tendencies in modern historiography see: A. Ziolkowski, Storia 
di Roma, Milano, 2000, p. 413-414. 
3 See p. ex. M. Kulikowski, Cities and Government in Late Antique Hispania, en: His-
pania in Late Antiquity, Leiden-Boston, 2005, p. 31-70. 
4 See p. ex. J.-M. Carrié, A. Rouselle, L’Empire romain en mutation, París, 1999. 
5 Our recognition of the three crises in Rome’s history means that we in principle share 
the generally accepted view on the existence of the so-called crisis in the third century. 
6 For details, see. S.L. Utchenko, Crisis and Fall of the Roman Republic, Moscow, 1965 
(in Russian); N.V. Checanova, Roman Dictatorship of the Last Century of the Republic, St. 
Petesburg, 2005, p. 21-156; Yu.B. Tsirkin, Civil Wars in Rome. The Vanquished, St. Petes-
burg, 2005. 
7 K.F. Stroheker, Germanentum und Spätantike, Zürich-Stuttgart, 1965, s. 88-100. 
8 The significance of this event was emphasised already by Aurelius Victor (Caes. 24.7-11). 
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weapon of destruction was the army, this period may be called the time of the 
“military anarchy”9 (for all the relativity of the term). 
The events of the years 235-285 in the political sphere were the natural result of 
the development of the Roman state and the same time the dawn of a new epoch in 
its history. The Roman civitas of the republican times similary to the Greel polis 
had the three political institutions: popular assembly (comitia), council (Senate), the 
officials (magistrates). In the imperial period these three institutions survived but in 
the following instances: the army10, the Senate, the emperor and his bureaucratic 
apparatus. The relations between the three powers never remained stable, they were 
ever changing over the two and half centuries. In the duality of the Principate its 
monarchical component was becoming more and more predominant. Owing to the 
support of the army and the bureaucratic apparatus, the princeps was turning into a 
plenipotentiary ruler of the state. In the course of the Civil War in 193-197 and 
during the crisis of the Early Empire his patent predominance became especially 
manifest –Rome’s public opinion regarded the emperor as lord (dominus)11 and his 
retinue as a “divine house” (dominus divina). All this bespeaks not only a sharp 
increase of imperial authority but also a radical change in the very system of values 
in Rome. Its public opinion adopts this monarchic rule practically unconditionally. 
However, Rome’s imperial power was nor devoid of some fundamental contra-
diction. On the one hand the emperor’s authority was practically almost unlimited. 
The creation of the imperial state apparatus –absolutely independent of the society, 
based on a purely bureaucratic principle and consequently completely dependent on 
the emperor- made this power independent of Rome’s society as well. The em-
peror’s second support was the army. On the other hand, though, the emperorwas 
not a monarch by Gods’ favour, he remained the head of the Roman people. His 
authority was based on a combination of different powers. Whose concentration in 
one’s hands made it possible for the princeps to exercise this authority. As the head 
of the Roman people, the princeps received his enormous powers in theory from the 
Senate, this incarnation of the Roman state. Also in theory, the imperial power was 
not even hereditary. As a result, this vagueness and contradiction between theory 
and practice rendered the emperor’s authority relatively precarious12. 
_____________ 
 
9 M.I. Rostovtzeff, Society and Economy in the Roman Empire, St. Petesburg, 2002, T. II. 
P. 145-208 (in Russian). 
10 On the army as a special social organism see: A.V. Makhlayuk, Soldiers of the Roman 
Empire, St. Petesburg, 2006, p. 171-188. 
11 M. Le Glay, La religion romain, París, 1997, p. 67-68. 
12 Idem., Grandeza y caída del Imperio Romano, Madrid, 2002, p. 195-207; M. Bats, S. 
Benoist, S. Lefevre, L’empire romain au IIIe siècle, París, 1997, p. 77-91. 
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The second facet of the Principate as a state system was the authority of the Sen-
ate. The stronger the emperor’s rule became the lesser was the real power of the 
Sente. However, it did not disappeaar altogether. Unlike the Early principate period, 
when the Senate played a considerable role in the government of the state and its 
provinces, some time later it lost its important role of a governing body. Created 
and finally structures by Hadrian, this state power apparatus was capable to substi-
tute and even completely oust the Senate apparatus on both state and provincial 
levels13. However, the Roman conscience believed not only in eternity but also in 
an uninterrupted evolution of the state and the visual embodiment of the Roman 
statehood and its uninterrupted existence was the Senate. Theoretically, it was still 
the supreme body of authority on a par with the princeps and in some respects even 
higer than the latter, but on some occasions he was even above the princeps since he 
was authorized to endow every new ruler with his supreme power or on the contrary 
to deprive him of any power altogether. However, in practice it was rather a rare 
occasion as for instance was the case with Nero in 68, Didus Julianus in 193 and 
Maximus Thrax in 238. As previously, the senators werw the prime estate of Rome 
end therefore they were endowed with numerous privileges, first and foremost wiyh 
the right to occupy the highest posts in the state. Being a member of this stratum 
was a hereditary prestige yet, on the other hand, the emperor was fully authorized to 
make some worthy man a member of the Senate or, on the contrary under some 
pretext or order, to deprive any one of his membership in the Senate. Mind. During 
a civil war the emperor was quite able to do it even without any formal pretext14. In 
principle as well as according to general conviction, the princeps had to belong to 
the Senate but during the crisis the throne was occupied by the equestrian Macrinus; 
he did not reing long but the fact became a precedent. Senators werw very proud of 
their status; they despised their juniors and cringed to their superiors. The Senate as 
a corporation regarded itself on a par with the emperor but every senator individu-
ally considered himself to be the emperor’s vassal. 
The place of the Roman people as a political institution was in fact occupied by 
the army, which had changed by that time as well. The creation of a professional 
army quite naturally resulted in the appearance of army corporative morals. The 
soldiers as Roman citizens had always regarded themselves as part an parcel of the 
civic collective but a better part and superior to non-military population at that15. It 
is plainly seen in the speech that Herodian (VII,8,4-8) puts into Maximinus’ mouth 
in which he opposes the courage of his soldiers who terrified and terrorized the 
Germans, Sauromats, and Persians alike to panic-striken, mad with fear Carthagin-
_____________ 
 
13 G. Poma, Le istituzioni politiche del mondo romano, Bologna, 2002, p. 146-149. 
14 M. Bats, S. Benoist, S. Lefevre, op. cit., p. 118-119. 
15 A.V. Makhlayuk, op. cit., p. 208-227, 246. 
J.B. Tsirkin Once again about “Military Anarchy” 
 
Gerión  
2010, 28, núm. 1, 141-156 
145 
ians who instead of military training are busy singing, laughing and versifying and 
to wretched, miserable Romans who are able only to cry and scatter in terror at the 
sight of two or three armed men. The “civilians” paid the soldiers with the same 
coin. Herodian descrives the Pannonian legionaries as blood-thirsty, slow-witted 
and unable to discern the craft and slyness in their generals’ speeches. Such was the 
general citizens’ opinion of the soldiers16. With the passage of time the ways of the 
army and the civil society drifted more and more apart. No doubt the soldiers were 
faithful to Rome and the Empire but their loyalty to the motherland was trasmitted 
through the attitude towards their general and indefinal analysis to the emperor as 
the supreme commander-in-chief. In case of a conflict between the emperor and 
their own general, however, soldiers as a rule took the side of the latter17. 
Another significant change of this time was the soldiers’ increased permanency 
of life. Accustomed to live in a certain place they hated to have to move to any 
theatres of war operations. Not without reason did Tacitus (Hist. I,53,14) write that 
living side by side with civilians (paganos) spoiled the warriors. But under the 
conditions of the strong emperor’s authority they could hardly give vent to their 
discontent. The reforms of Septimius Severus could not but aggravate still further 
the contradictions between the army’s permanent way of life and the urgent need 
for its mobility. Having got thr right to have a family and some land to provide for 
it, the soldiers felt they belonged to some concrete country rether than to the Em-
pire18.it was the soldiers’ dread of the Germanic devastating raids that compelled 
Alexander Severus to end his war with Persia and to start necessary preparations for 
the German campaing (Herod. VI,7,2-5). It does not mean at all that the Roman 
soldiers began to represent the interests of the local people. In this respect, of great 
interest is the petition of the colons of Asia Minor to Philip the Arab with com-
plaints about cruel uses and abuses not only on the part of local authorities but also 
of the soldiers who robbed and brought them to ruin (CIL III,14191). The soldiers 
enjoyed their corporate interests which were primarily bound with the concrete 
regions and a concrete army or even with a concrete military unit rather than with 
Rome. This state of things undermined to some degree the unity of the imperial 
army under the circumstances of a growing political strife it could and often did 
provoke clashes between military units. 
The emperor, the Senate and the army became indeed the leading actors of the 
dramatic events in 235-285. It is hardly worthwhile to divide between soldiers-
_____________ 
 
16 J.-M. Carrié, Il soldato, en: L’uomo romano, Bari, 2003, p. 131. 
17 Comp.: L. Capogrossi Colognesi, Storia di Roma tra diritti e potere, Bologna, 2009, p. 
410-412. 
18 J.-M. Carrié, op. cit., p. 112-127. 
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emperors and Senate-emperors as was customary until recently in historiography19. 
A truly soldier-emperor was perhaps only Maximinus and maybe some usurpers, 
whereas Senate-emperors as such were Pupienus and Balbinus. All the other rulers 
of the period under study defy any attempts to divide them into groups according to 
this principle. Still it will be unwise to deny the existence and role of these institu-
tions –the army and the Senate. It is necessary, however, to bear in mind that the 
signifiance and the political weight of the Senate or the army in different periods 
was also different. 
From the point of view of political history the epoch of the fall of the Early Em-
pire must be divided into two long periods with the rule of Gallienus in between20. 
The coup d’etat of the year 235 was a novelty in Rome’s history. For the first time 
the coup was initiated by soldiers themselves even if the mutiny was provoked by 
Maximianus’ own intrigues or those of one of his associates. Thus the army –for the 
first time ever after the civil wars of the end of the Republic- stood out as an inde-
pendent active force but not only as a tool in the ambitions general’s hands21. 
Maximianus’ mutiny may be compared in this respect with Sulla’s army attack 
against Rome in 88 B.C. That rebellion against Rome ushered in the period of the 
Republic’s fall, whereas this coup heralded the decline of the Early Empire. Now 
the development of the Roman state followed along the same route as during the 
Severus’ rule. 
The wholw period up to the joint rule of Valerian and Gallienus inclusive is 
characterized by endless attempts to reach some compromise betweewn the con-
stant consolidation of the emperor’s power and the Senate’s claim to at least main-
tain its position. The watershed was Gallienus’ reform debarring the senators from 
military service22. This imperial act not only deprived them of their power over the 
legions but also of their viceregency in the “armed” provinces. And although this 
_____________ 
 
19 See for instance: E.M. Staerman, The Crisis of the Slave-Owning System in the West-
ern Provinces of the Roman Empire, Moscow, 1957 (in Russian). 
20 P. Southern begins his survey of the new period in Rome’s history with the captivity 
of Valerian and the establishment of Gallienus’ autocracy; for him the time from the year 
235 to the year 260 is still part of the previous period  begun in 180 with the advent of 
Commodus to power: P. Southern, The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine, Lon-
don-New York, 2004, p. 14-80. D.S. Potter views as an uninterrupted period of the decline 
of Severus’ Empire the time from Alexander Severus’ coming to power on the one hand and 
the establishment of the Sasanides’ dominion on the other, down to Gallienus’ death: D.S. 
Potter, The Roman Empire at Bay, New York, 2004, p. 217-262. 
21 I. Sergeyev, The Roman Empire in the third century, Kharkov, 1999, p. 161 (in Rus-
sian). We are leaving alone for the time being the issue whether the uprising in the Rhine 
army was spontaneous or well prepared beforehand by Vitellius and his allies. 
22 The reform of Gallienus is the topic of our other paper. 
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reform was not realized overnight, soon the Senate lost all influence on the state 
armed forces. With the state’s financial policy almost exclusively in the emperor’s 
hands, under his nearly complete control, the Senate lost all material footholds for 
its power and it de facto all its authority. Sometimes the emperors were moved for 
various reasons to do the Senate some favours as did for exemple Claudius and 
Probus, but actually the real situation remained unaltered. The Senate ceased to 
exist as an organ of state power, it lived on only as a corporation and a symbol of 
Roman statehood without any levers of real power. All attempts to reach a com-
promise between the emperor and the Senate werw doomed to failure. Soon after 
this reign, the second period if the “military anarchy” set in; it was marked by a 
constant consolidation of the emperor’s autocracy. 
During the second period of the “military anarchy” an important landmark was 
the government of Aurelian who with an iron amalgamated the Roman Empire that 
had didintegratged de facto into three parts under Gallienus. The success of his wars 
in the East and West was consummated with a spectacular triumph in 274 (Eutr. 
IX.13.2; SHA Trig. Tyr. 24,4; 25,5; 30,3-4, Aur. 33-34). Aurelian was equally 
adamant and ruthless in his home policies too. He resolutely suppressed not only 
riots such as the riot in the Roman mint (SHA Aur. 38.2; Aur. Vict. Caes. 35.6; Epit. 
35.4; Eutrop. IX.14) but also any kind of opposition. The suppression of the spiri-
tual opposition in the Orient23 and ruthless executions of Senators in Rome (Eutrop. 
IX.14; Zos. I.49.2) eradicated a slightest chance of insubordination to the emperor. 
Aurelian was the first ruler of Roma in its history to introduce an official state cult –
the cult of the Invincible Sun (Sol Invictus)24. He considered himself to be the god’s 
reflection on earth, moreover, to be a “born god”, i. E. God who was unlike other 
celestial goods born not in heaven but on earth. The emperor himself is “lord an 
god” (precisely god, deity not just a divine being, the way many – though not all 
emperors became after death)25. And characteristically Rome’s society wholeheart-
edly shares his faith in his divine nature. Aurelian is believed to have said in his 
address to the mutinous soldiers: they are wrong to assume that the emperors’ 
destiny lies in their hands, because actually it is god not soldiers who endowed him 
_____________ 
 
23 What is meant is first and foremost the execution of Longinus who was obviously the 
chief ideologist of the separation of Palmyra from the Empire (SHA Aur. 27.2-5; 30.1-3) and 
the deposition of Paul of Samosata from the Episcopal chair in Antiochia (Euseb. Hist. Eccl. 
VII. 30.1-19). 
24 F. Millar, The Roman Empire and Its Neighbours, London, 1967, p. 244. 
25 M. Le Glay, La religion romain, p. 68-69. True, such appellation of Aurelian is not to 
be found in Rome, it is used only in the provinces, which may be interpreted as the provin-
cial perception of Aurelian after his glorious victories: T. Kotula, Aurélien et Zénobie, 
Wroclaw, 1997, p. 159-161. However, all these inscriptions and legendsare in line with the 
general tendency in the emperor’s home policies. 
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with his purple, and only god will determine the duration of his reign (FHG IV. 
Anon. Fr. 10.6, p. 197). As has been stated above, it is the first fact ever recorded in 
the Roman history that the emperor admits he owes his destiny to god and only to 
god (hence the Invincible Sun)26  and therefore he is responsible neither to the 
people of Rome, nor to the Senate, nor to the army. Unlike his predecessors, 
Aurelian appealed not to the eternal city of Rome but directly to the divine will27. 
The imperial grandeur was plainly visible as well (SHA Aur. 45.4-5). Coinage 
became both de facto and de jure the emperor’s exclusive monopoly28. Thus the 
Senate was deprived of the last state function it had previously shared, however 
formally, with the emperor. Under Aurelian the Roman Empire actually, turned 
autocratic. Aurelian’s rule may be considered as important a stage in the develop-
ment of Rome’s imperial power as that of Gallienus. But it is necessary to stress 
that without Gallienus’ reform the steps of Aurelian would hardly have been viable, 
at least in this shape and at that pace. 
The relationship between the emperor and the Senate was summed up by Carus. 
He at best inly informed the Senate that he had been declared emperor but re-
strained from seeking the Senate’s recognition of his supremacy (Aur. Vic. Caes. 
37.5). Carus became the first lawful emperor of Rome who was not recognized by 
the Senate. The implication is –the Senate was stripped of its last state function. 
Though this organ lived on, from the “constitutional” history of Rome it was de-
leted once and for all29. The Principate as a political system created by Augustus 
breathed its last. Suetonius (Cal. 22.2) in his time had accused Caligula of having 
turned principate into some kind of kingdom. It had cost Caligula his life. Cut about 
two and half centuries later and almost a century and half after Suetonius had writ-
ten this emperor’s biography, Caligula achieved his aim –instead of the Principate 
regni forma emerged in Rome30. 
So the first and perhaps the most significant result of the “military anarchy” was 
the autocratic nature of the emperor’s power. 
The second important feature of the “military anarchy” period was the ever 
growing tendency of regionalising and decentralising the Roman Empire. The 
tendency was accelerated by the fact that money had actually dropped out of circu-
_____________ 
 
26 E. Groag, Domitius, en: RE, 1903. Hbd. 9. Sp. 1405. 
27 M. Bats, S. Benoist, S. Lefevre, op. cit., p. 99. 
28 J.-P. Callu, La politique monétaire des empereurs romains de 238 à 311, París, 1969, 
p. 140. 
29 F. Grelle, La forma dell’Imperio, en: Storia di Roma, Torino, 1999, p. 573. 
30 The consolidation of the emperor’s authority in the period of the “military anarchy” 
went hand in hand with a fragile power of some concrete emperor. But the analysis of the 
reasins of this situation is not the topic of the present article. 
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lation31, and as result the Empire’s single economic whole got disrupted. It did not 
bring about the disintegration of the single state because the Romans had still a very 
strong feeling of complicity and oneness with the country and the common cause – 
res publica populi Romani Quiritum, but it required some urgent institutional deci-
sions which could combine the growing regionalization with the preservation of the 
unity of Rome as an empire. Military and political circumstances also cried for such 
effective measures. When the emperor had -sometimes simultaneously- to repulse 
the enemies’ attacks and to quell another munity (or a least its potential threat), the 
ruler was not able to grapple wiyh all the challenges. It became vitally important to 
somewath decentralise the country’s government. Even in the previous years in 
cases of emergency the emperor could trust the supreme power over a part of the 
state to his trustee. But on the other hand it was extremely dangerous to concentrate 
much authority over a vast territory and especially over many troops in one man’s 
hands. 
A way out of the quandary the emperors saw in granting such power to their 
relatives. Philip created two quasi-vice-kingdoms with the next of kin at the head –
his brother Priscus and obviously his wife’s brother Severianus (Zos. I, 19.2; 20.2; 
CIL III, 14149)32. Valerian made Gallienus is co-ruler granting him full authority 
over the western part of the Empire but leaving its eastern part to himself (Zoas. I, 
30.1). Some territories and the stationed there troops were governed by the other 
members of the ruling house. Carus ready to launch his Persian campaing left 
Carinus behind in the West (SHA Car., 7.1; 8.2). but there was a certain shortage of 
the ruling house members. Nevertheless, to entrust the outsiders with such plenary 
powers was of mortal danger –they could easily be tempted to abuse them and seize 
the throne, the way it did actually happen in the reign of Philip; Pacatianus and later 
Decius who became governors in the wake of Severianus, opposed the emperor 
(Aur. Vict. Caes. 28.10; Epit. 28.2; Eutrop. IX.3; Zos. I.20.2-21; Sync. P. 683; Zon. 
XII.19). Pacatianus’ munity was suppressed but Decius won the victory and became 
emperor. 
The measures undertaken in the third century to decentralise the supreme power 
were not the result of a well-thought-over programme of political reforms. They 
were brought to life by a certain situation and therefore they were not systematic 
but sporadic and rather haphazard. Once having consolidated their supreme position, 
the rulers of this period were reluctant to lessen their authority but the events to 
come showed plainly the inevitability of the division of powers. The elimination of 
the republican and polis institutions on the highest level and their weakening on a 
_____________ 
 
31 J.-M. Carrié, A. Roussell, op. cit. P. 127-128. 
32 Ibid., p. 133, 143; J. Fitz, Die Vereinigung der Donauprovinzen in der Mitte des 3. 
Jahrhunderts, en: Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms., Köln-Graz, 1967, s. 127-128. 
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lower level radically decreased the significance of the horizontal links in the Empire, 
which inevitably led to the strengthening of its vertical ties without which the state 
would have collapsed. Yet under the conditions of increasing regionalisation of the 
Empire the rigid vertical power of alone could not guarantee the governability of 
such a huge state. Therefore the subsequent decentralisation of the highest state 
government and the actual division of the Roman Empire into large separate territo-
ries (for all its both psychological and official unity) were quite unavoideble. At 
such moments the figure and personality of the emperor alone was still able to keep 
the country together33. 
It should be stressed that the decentralisation “from above” and the decentralisa-
tion “from below” went side by side. Whwn the central government failed to ensure 
safety from the barbarians and a more  orless normal functioning of society in some 
region, the inhabitants of the region took the usurper’s side34. In this way, on the 
Roman Empire’s territory there came into being every now and then regional “em-
pires” –some ephemeral, others quite viable. 
The third salient feature of the period under study is Rome began to lose its 
functions of the imperial capital. Even in the previous years the emperors could also 
live outside the Ethernal City for different lengths of time. During the “military 
anarchy” such absences from the capital became practically a regular feature. No 
doubt they were caused by considerations of foreing policy and military affairs. The 
emperors were obliged to be as near the most vulnerable regions as possible or 
sometimes even directly on the theatre of war operations at the head of the army. 
Where the emperor was there the emergency decisions were made. Rome was still 
officially caput mundi, the world’s head but practically the real emperor’s resi-
dences were coming to the fore35. And soon the capital was officially transferred to 
Constantinople. 
The fourth remarkable feature of this period was the deep-rooted radical changes 
within the ruling elite of the Roman state, in its “political class”. In this respect the 
two above-mentioned periods differ sharply, as is plainly apparent from the emper-
ors’ lives. Most emperors before Gallienus and Gallienus himself were senators36. 
Even though some of them, for instance Aemilianus, were of “low” origin, on the 
_____________ 
 
33 V.I. Ukolova, op. cit., p. 24-25. 
34 That was why the Gaul Empire came into being: J.-M. Carrié, A. Roussell, op. cit. p. 
104. 
35 M. Bats, S. Benoist, S. Lefevre, op. cit., p. 214-216. 
36 With the Romanisation of the Roman Empire, more and more emperors were born not 
in Rome or Italy but in the provinces. However they all came from the upper strata of the 
provincial society and all belonged to the Senate estate. 
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way to the throne they all passed through the Senate37. The only exception was 
Maximinus, the case of Philippus is moot. Certainly the young Gordianus III was 
not a senator but he was of a noble senatorial family. Many usurpers came also of 
senators’ nobility. A telltale speech was ascribed to Ballista (Callistus) who abdi-
cated the throne not only on account of his age but also because of his occupation 
(professio) since he was but Valerian’s prefect (SHA Trig. Tyr. 12.1; 4)38. After 
Gallienus, only one senator –Tacitus- occupied the throne, by the army’s consent at 
that (Aur. Vict. Caes. 35.9; SHA Aur. 40.1-2; Tac. 2.2; Zon. XII.28)39. Moreover, 
most emperors of the second period came to power at the end of a long way starting 
as private soldiers. Except Maximinus, after Claudius it became a rule as for Dio-
cletian he is suspected to have been a freedman (Eutrop. IX.19.2; Epit. 39.1)40. As is 
often the case, the ruin of the former orders and a general disturbance paved the 
way up to the very top of public and social life to clever energetic and ambitious 
people, not overscrupulous about their ways and means and even cruel, if need be. 
The situation on the throne reflected the general situation in the ruling elite of 
the state. In former times, preliminary inclusion in the Senate was almost an im-
perative stipulation for a successful career. Such was the way to the top of M. 
Valerius Maximianus, an equestrian by birth whom Marcus Aurelius included 
among praetorians in the Sente and who later proved to be a successful commander 
of legions in different provinces41 . Exceptions were extremeñy rare. Since the 
midthird century (sometimes, thoug seldom, even earlier than that) the road to the 
highest echelons of state government bypassed the Senate42. Under the crcum-
stances of almost incessant civil wars and quick replacements of emperors, close 
links with a particular ruler usually come to the fore and his retainers irrespective of 
_____________ 
 
37 Aemillianus was a Moor of low parentage (Eutrop. IX.6; Epit. 31.3) but by the time he 
was proclaimed emperor, he had been governor of Moesia and, as is know, prior to Gal-
lienus’ reform only a senator could become a fully-fledged legate. 
38 The author alludes to Meonius Actionax who claimed to have been an eye witness of 
the event. 
39 True, if we must believe Carus’ biographer, he also was a senator, but this is a disput-
able issue. Even if he did belong to the Senate estate, we may deduce judging by his name 
Aurelius that he had joined it only very recently. 
40 Eutropius suggests two versions of Diocletian’ origin: a scribe’s son and the senator 
Anullinus’ freedman. The uncertainly about the background of such important and esteemed 
a ruler as Diocletian may be explained by the fact his parents were so socially insignificant 
that nobody cered much and knew much about them. 
41 R. Hanslik, Valerius, en: Klaine Pauly, 1979, Bd. 5 Sp. 1113; G. Alföldy, Storia 
sociale dell’antica Roma, Bologna, 1987, p. 237. 
42 M. Bats, S. Benoist, S. Lefevre, op. cit., p. 121. 
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their estate join the ruling elite43. Prosopographic research indicated that the new 
ruling group if the Late Empire, its generals in particular go back to the time not 
until the reign of Diocletian44. It means that during the “military anarchy” the old 
political and military elite represented basically by members of the Senate estate 
had abandoned the political scene. 
It does not at all mean that the senators had lost their position altogether. They 
had suffered but insignificant changes only. As far we can judge by the senators of 
that time that we know of, more than half of them belonged to this estate by birth45. 
On the whole they not only retained but even multiplied their riches. They managed 
to preserve their high moral prestige as well46. As for their political weight as well 
as that of the Senate it became insignificant. During the Late Empire there was a 
gap between the economically ruling class (i. e. chiefly senators and their families) 
and the politically prevalent class (generals and civil bureaucracy). Such was the 
result of the “miliktary anarchy”. 
The third century is considered in historiography as the great century of the 
equestrian estate47. Indeed senators were increasingly replaced in the real political 
elite by equestrians. Yet far more important than the rise of the equestrians as a new 
powerfull estate was the advent of professionals controlling the main levers in the 
civil and military government48. The former polis principle according to which any 
citizen (in theory at least) could occupy any office, had finally become a thing of 
the past. Well –educated and at times even talented dilettantes had been ousted by 
skilled professionals- experienced and skillful officers and functionaries. Certanly 
most of them were equestrians but their place and role in the state was determined 
by their personal qualities and abilities (their loyalty to the concrete emperor among 
them) rather than their “equestrianship”. As far as we can gather from some exam-
ples, many people who managed in the final analysis to obtain important state 
offices as well as some emperors came from the “bottom” of the provincials. 
Summing up, the new ruling elite is formed according to new rules. Bureaucratic 
and military hierachies are set up onpersonal ties between  the chief (even the 
topmost one, the emperor) and his subordinates. Proximity and intimacy with the 
emperor rather then one’s origin can guarantee one the uppermost posts in the 
_____________ 
 
43 H. Demandt, Der spätrömische Militäradel, en: Chiron, 1980, Bd. 10, s. 635-636. 
44 Ibid., s. 615-616. 
45 J.-M. Carrié, A. Roussell, op. cit. p. 662. 
46 A. Chastagnol. L’evolution de l’ordre sénatorial aux III et IV siècle de notre ère, en: 
Revue Historique, 1970, t. 496, p. 308. Possibily, though, this prestige seemed higher in the 
eyes of the senators themselves than it actually was in the Roman society. 
47 G. Alföldy, Storia..., p. 238. 
48 J.-M. Carrié, A. Roussell, op. cit. p. 662. 
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Empire49. It its turn a high position secured easy acces to the imperial hierarchy to 
all sorts of people, even to the “barbarians” as became a common practice later. 
The fifth important phenomenon of the period under study was a new ideologi-
cal and psycological type of relations between the authorities and society. It should 
be pointed out however that this change began to evolve some time previously. As 
is often the case, in the ideological sphere such changes take place quicker than in a 
material reality; Septimius Severus was already called dominus and in his reign the 
notion of a divine house was introduced. This tendency (not without halts and 
retreats though) became stronger during the “military anarchy”. The phrase dominus 
noster became an obligatory epithet of the emperor and in fact turned into a fixed 
element of thr emperor’s title alongside felix and invictus50. The impression is that 
both the emperors themselves and the Roman society at large were doing their 
utmost to convince each other how happy they were and how invincible was their 
empire, Rome’s present mishap notwithstanding. At the slightest provocation the 
emperors assumed triumphal appellations and the fewer their victories and the less 
significant they were, the more numerous and the more magnificent became their 
triumphal titles. A striking example is Philippus the Arab. After the defeat of the 
Roman army he was compelled to conclude an unremunerative treaty and to pay the 
Persian king an enormous sum of money but he presented his disaster as the great-
est victory and became Parthicus maximus and Persicus maximus (ILS 506-507)51. 
No doubt it reflects the growing sacralisation of Rome’s imperial authority52. 
There are some other signs of this sacralisation. The emperors attempted to bind 
themselves with gods as much as possible. More and more figures of attendant gods 
– “companions” and “custodians” of princeps were minted on the Roman coins. 
Previously it had happened as well but only sporadically, whereas after Gallienus 
and his adversary Postumus it was already a usual practice53. This tendency found 
its culmination during Aurelian’s rule. It was no longer enough for him to play the 
role of the gods’ darling and a minion of fortune; he actually identified himself with 
the Lord god, and his rise and eminence of the imperial authority found their reflec-
tion in his outward appearance. The first step in this direction was taken by Gal-
lienus: he put on splendid raiments and footwear and on occasions crowned his 
head with a diadem (SHA Gal. 16.4). However the public at large misunderstood his 
_____________ 
 
49 D.S. Potter, op. cit., p. 386. 
50 Numerous inscriptions testify to this. 
51 The title Persicus can be found on some coins too: M.G. Abramzon, Roman Army and 
its Leader from Coins, Chelyabinsk, 1994, p. 103. 
52 W. Ensslin, The End of the Principate, en: CAH, 1939, vol. XII, p. 357-360. 
53 E.M. Staerman, The Social Bases of Ancient Roman religion, Moscow, 1987, p. 289-
290 (in Russian). 
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intentions and blamed him for this fondness of extravagance. Two years later, on 
Gallienus’ assassination, Aurelian ascended the throne and did the same even on a 
grander scale (Epit. 35.5) but it was calmly received and caused no objection. 
Since olden times the Romans had firmly believed in the eternity of the City of 
Rome. In the imperial epoch this eternity was embodied in the emperor’s eternity 
(certainly, not of a concrete mortal person but the head of the Roman people)54. 
Hence the permanent epithets so widespread in the third century:  aetternus, per-
petuus, and the like. The joint eternity of Rome and imperial power was best re-
flected in the pageantry on the occasion of the Millennium of Rome celebrated by 
Philipp the Arab (Eutrop. IX.3; Aur. Vict. Caes. 28.1; Epit. 28.3). Beginning with 
Gordianus III, almost every emperor promised the advent of a new century when all 
evil and troubles of the world would be done away with and the golden age would 
set in. The eternity of Rome, the Empire and the emperor and the felicity of human-
kind tighly intertwined made up the corner stone of the ideology of the “military 
anarchy” epoch55. 
With the growing sacralisation of the emperor’s power, the very figure of the 
emperor is soaring up on a superhuman level. As has been stated above, Aurelian 
proclaimed his absolute independence of popular or soldiers’ opinion. There was a 
distance of only one short step to his declaration that he would suffer no interfer-
ence into his affairs from any human institution. This particular step was taken by 
Carus who refused point-black to get his authority legalised by the Senate. 
Aurelian not only raised his power and his own person beyond human reach but 
he also in fact introduced a state religion. In Rome religion had always been closely 
tied with the state and politics, but at that time a considerable qualitative leap took 
place in the field of religion. The cult of the Invincible Sun was gaining foothold as 
both the most respected and revered and even obligatory for the whole Empire 
partly to the detriment of other deities. In terms of politics, it was the beginning of 
the “Holy Empire”, a theocratic monarchy in which the leading role was not played 
by the religious head but by the emperor himself, now de facto the religious chief of 
the state. 
The second side of this process is public attitudes towards him in the state. Hav-
ing usurped practically unlimited power and placed himself obove the human world, 
the emperor accepted a tremendous responsability as well. Right from the start the 
moral grounds of the imperial authority were as follows: stability in society, pros-
perity of the citizens, Rome’s grandeur and victories in wars. Under the shocking 
conditions of the third century the public faith in the emperor-saviour increased ten-
fold, but far from all throne holders met those expectations. In such cases both 
_____________ 
 
54 J.-M. Carrié, A. Roussell, op. cit. p. 106; V.I. Ukolova, op. cit., p. 22. 
55 Cf.: E.M. Staerman, The Social Bases..., p. 288. 
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soldiers and most civilians supported not the head of the state but the victorious 
general56. 
Besides another (at first sight opposite) phenomenon is worth mentioning. Bar-
baric raids growing ever more frequent and destructive; the incessant financial crisis 
and a resultant sharp drop in the life standards of broad masses of people; arbitrary 
rule of local authorieties, soldiers stationed nearby, landlords and big leasesholders 
and most of all the emperors’ manifest inability to check and cure all the nation’s 
ill-all these led to the alienation of many people from the authorities in general. The 
mounting sacralisation of the emperor’s power resulted also in the mass disap-
pointment with the official religion. Leaving alone the religious background of the 
period for the time being, we shall stress that of all cults and religions practised at 
that time only Christianity offered a considerable oppossition to the current prac-
tices. By no means a political opposition, moreover emphasising its political loyalty 
at every turn, Christianity ideologically denied the existing order. St. Cyprien had a 
good reason for prophesying the advent of Anti-Christ and the last time in its 
wake57. It in principle opposes the Christian ideas against the idea of Eternal City 
and its empire above all and consequently against the idea of the emperor as its 
symbol. Valerian’s catastrophe and his ignominious captivity only accentuated the 
fragility of the “Roman myth”. The later part of thr third century is exactly the time 
that Christianity began to win over the sympathy and support of the masses in the 
Roman Empire58. 
Too sum up, the period of the “military anarchy” witnessed the decline and fall 
of the political institutions of the Early Empire, first and foremost of the Principate 
as a political structure based on an integral unity of the monarchic and polis-
republican elements. During the civil war at the ende of the republican epoch, as we 
well know, some seeds of the empire were already ripening; likewise in the period 
under review were gathering strength or just appearing new elements of a future 
state –the Late Empire. The “military anarchy” may be interpreted not only as a 
time of total destruction but also as a transition from one stage of the Roman state 
to another, more in line with a political, social, economic, religious and ideological 
reality of the state59. The transition was not relatively smooth, evolutionary, though; 
it was rather spasmodic, i.e. revolutionary. R. Syme once labelled the fall of the 
_____________ 
 
56 J.-M. Carrié, A. Roussell, op. cit. p. 105-106; J. Scheid, La religione a Roma, Roma-
Bari, 2004, p. 151-152. 
57 G. Alföldy, Die Krise des Römischen Reiches, Stuttgart, 1989, s. 484-490. These 
views were also shared by other Christians, especially during the mass persecution. 
58 D.S. Potter, op. cit., p. 313; A. Ziolkowski, op. cit., p. 420. 
59 K. Christ, Römische Geschichte, Darmstatdt, 1980, s. 233. 
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Republic as a revolution60. By analogy the “military anarchy” may be defined as the 
second Roman revolution. Many emperors contributed their share towards the 
making of a new type of the state but, no doubt, the major steps on the way were the 
reforms of Gallienus and Aurelian while the finishing touch was put by Carus. At 
this time an autocratic monarchy becomes de facto firmly established, a new politi-
cal elite comes to power, Rome begins to lose its status of the capital, the initial 
measures to decentralise the imperial government are undertaken, the emperor’s 
power soars sky-high and he claims dependency exclusively on divine forces. All 
these will be the Late Empire’s salient features. Since the adoption of Christianity 
as a state religion, a new type of ideological relationa between the authority and the 
society of Rome will take shape. 
 
 





60 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, Oxford, 1939. 
